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I.

THE IMPORTANCE OF FLEXIBLE REALLOCATION OF EXISTING
WATER SUPPLIES

As urban areas, industry, and recreational and environmental uses of
water expand, the issue of reallocation of existing supplies of water

expands with them.
Indeed, in light of the high economic and
environmental costs of developing new water supplies, reallocation may be
a necessary condition for further economic development of semi-arid

f Charles W. Howe is Professor of Economics and Professional Staff, Environment
and Behavior Program, Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado at Boulder.
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regions.'
This article focuses on the potential usefulness of extended water
markets in which public values are adequately protected.
It will
concentrate on the issues of economic efficiency and fairness of water
markets in regions that have adopted the appropriations doctrine, typically
semi-arid regions where irrigated agriculture accounts for a large part of
consumptive use.
The concept of economic efficiency refers to allocating scarce
resources to maximize the net value of all useful products and services,
marketed or non-marketed. 2 At the individual project or policy change
level, economic efficiency is reflected in a cost-benefit analysis that
calculates
the present values of marketed and non-marketed outputs and
3
costs.

The definition of "fairness" or "equity" is far more subjective.
However, the public places great weight on some perception of equity in
judging programs or projects. No matter how one defines equity, the
distribution of benefits and costs across affected parties can be estimated as
part of the cost-benefit analysis. This distributional analysis is especially
important in designing policies and projects aimed at disadvantaged groups.
In the longer term, the perceived fairness of the distribution of benefits and
costs can affect the economic efficiency of projects through public
reactions and project participation.4
Markets provide flexible and voluntary ways of reallocating resources
under the right circumstances, therefore, water markets have been strongly
advocated for many years. 5 The major advantages of water markets over
other methods of allocation are: (1) they provide for flexible reallocation
1. R. Maria Saleth & Ariel Dinar, Water Challenge and Institutional Response (A
Cross-Country Perspective), in POLICY RESEARCH WORKING PAPER 2045-THE WORLD
BANK 40-43 (1999); Charles W. Howe, Socially Efficient Development and Allocation of
Water in Developing Countries: Roles for the Public and Private Sectors, in MANAGING
RENEWABLE NATURAL RESOURCES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (Charles W. Howe ed.,
1982).
2. PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT
22, 22-25 (1992).
3. See RICHARD 0. ZERBE, JR. & DWIGHT D DIVELY, BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit
Analysis
(last
modified
April
1999)
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tarabstract id = 164902>.
Some advocate a multiplecriteria approach in which impacts on more esoteric non-market services (e.g. biodiversity)
are simply described as information for the decision-making process. See INTERNATIONAL
HYDROLOGICAL PROGRAMME OF UNESCO, MULTICRITERIA DECISION ANALYSIS IN WATER
RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, U.N. Doc. SC.94/WS.14 (Janos J. Bogardi & Hans-Peter
Nachtnebel eds., 1994); see also U.S. WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL, ECONOMIC AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES
IMPLEMENTATION STUDIES (1983).

4. See Charles W. Howe, Water Resources Planning in a Federation of States: Equity
versus Efficiency, 36 NAT. RESOURCES J. 29-30 (1996); see also H. PEYTON YOUNG,
EQUITY IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (1994).
5. See L;M. HARTMAN & DON SEASTONE, WATER TRANSFERS: ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY
AND ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS (1970); WATER RIGHTS: SCARCE RESOURCE ALLOCATION,
BUREAUCRACY, AND THE ENVIRONMENT (Terry L. Anderson ed.,
1983); SHARING
SCARCITY: GAINERS & LOSERS IN WATER MARKETING (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994).
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over time in response to economic, demographic, and social-value changes;
(2) they involve only "willing seller-willing buyer" transactions; (3) due to
the nature of "willing seller-willing buyer" transactions, they provide
security of tenure of property rights; (4) by providing market evidence of
the value of water, they continually confront the water user with the real
"opportunity cost" of the water being used, regardless of the oftendistorted prices charged by water distribution agencies; and (5) the
transaction costs of market transfers can be kept low under the right
circumstances.6
Examples of functioning water markets are found in the 100-year
history of water rights trading in Colorado.7 A particularly interesting and
well-known example is found in the Northern Colorado Water
Conservancy District of Colorado ("NCWCD"). 8 The Colorado-Big
Thompson Project, a water project that the Bureau of Reclamation began in
1937 and completed in 1957, delivers water acquired from the western
slope of the Rocky Mountains to the NCWCD on the eastern side of the
mountains. In turn, NCWCD delivers water to agricultural and urban
users on the basis of ownership of shares in the NCWCD. These shares
are readily tradable in an active market to any user able to demonstrate the
ability and intent to put the water to "beneficial use." The NCWCD
facilitates trading by maintaining a bulletin board for offers to buy and sell.
Brokers also play an indirect role, although they must avoid the "beneficial
use-speculation" conflict. Transaction costs are very low.
Another example, the California Water Bank operated in the latter
parts of the extended drought of 1986-1991. 9 The California Water Bank
was a State of California and Bureau of Reclamation sponsored program
intended to bring buyers and sellers together during the severe drought.
Transfers were for one year only, 1991, and, during this period,
approximately 800,000 acre-feet changed hands.
In the western United States, one finds some significant barriers to the
reallocation of water in general and to water markets in particular. First,
although various parties proposed interstate water market arrangements,
there are no interstate water sales." ° Many vested interests oppose
6.

Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential

for Water Markets, 22

WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH

439 (1986).

7. Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Water Transfer Process as a Management Option for
Meeting Changing Water Demands, report to the U.S. Geological Survey, No. 14-08-0001G1538, Nat. Resources L. Ctr., U. Colo. (April 1990); Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Teresa
A. Rice, Moving Agricultural Water to Cities: The Search for Smarter Approaches, 2
HASTINGS WEST-NORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 27 (1994).
8. See DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST: THE COLORADO-BIG
THOMPSON PROJECT AND THE NORTHERN COLORADO WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT

(1992); Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural Characteristics of
an Active Water Market, 30 WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 971 (1994); Charles W. Howe et
al., Innovations in Water Management: Lessons from the Colorado-Big Thompson Project

and Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, in

SCARCE WATER AND INSTITUTIONAL

171-200 (Kenneth D. Frederick ed., 1986).
9. Ray Coppock et al., California Water Transfers: The System and the 1991 Drought
Water Bank, in SHARING SCARCITY: GAINERS AND LOSERS IN CALIFORNIA WATER
MARKETING 21-40 (Harold 0. Carter et al. eds., 1994); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 7.
CHANGE

10.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

CONCEPTUAL

APPROACH

FOR REACHING BASIN

STATES
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interstate water markets for fear of permanently losing water allocated to
the state by compact. Water districts that receive water from federal and
state projects generally restrict water sales and leases to district boundaries
on the ground of protecting the financial base for repayment of project
costs."1 Arizona allows the sale of groundwater only with the sale of the
overlying land.' 2 California water market transactions are complicated by
water laws that combine the appropriation doctrine, the riparian doctrine,
old Spanish law,' 3 and the large amounts of state and federal project water
that are distributed under contract.
Several studies focused on the economic costs of the inability to
reallocate existing water supplies on an intrastate basis. H. J. Vaux and
Richard Howitt estimated for California that an annual savings of $200
million could be achieved through interregional (North-South) reallocation
of water from agriculture to urban areas, and that these savings could rise
to nearly $3 billion by 2020. "
Richard Wahl described numerous
opportunities within California and elsewhere for highly beneficial
reallocation. "
On an interstate basis, J. F. Booker and R.A. Young found in their
study of the allocation of Colorado River water between Upper and Lower
Basins that the institutional inability to account for values created by nonconsumptive instream uses (hydro-power, recreation, and salinity dilution)
resulted in excessive Upper Basin consumption from an economic
efficiency point of view.' 6 Others have estimated that instream values lost
on the Colorado River due to Upper Basin consumptive uses ranged from
$99 per acre-foot for the Green River sub-basin of the Upper Colorado
River Basin to $341 per acre-foot for the Upper Main Stem sub-basin.' 7
These impediments to water transfers are due in part to the slowness of
institutions to change in response to economic and social value changes.
Laws, regulations, and administrative policies often lag behind the

AGREEMENT
ON INTERIM OPERATION OF COLORADO RIVER SYSTEM RESERVOIRS,
CALIFORNIA'S USE OF COLORADO RIVER WATER ABOVE ITS BASIC APPORTIONMENT, AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN INTERSTATE WATER BANK (prepared for the Colorado River Basin
States Meeting, Colorado River Board of California (August 28, 1991)); RICHARD W.
WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS, AND THE BUREAU OF

RECLAMATION

11.

271-92 (1989).

RICHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS,

AND THE BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 127-44

(1989).

12. See Gary C. Woodard & Elizabeth Checchio, The Legal Framework for Water
Transfers, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 721 (1989).
13. See Brian E. Gray, A Prineron California Water Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV.
745, 745-82 (1989).
14. H.J. Vaux, Jr. & Richard E. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of
InterregionalTransfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 785 (1984).
15. See Richard W. Wahl, Market Transfers of Water in California, 1 HASTINGS WESTNORTHWEST J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 49 (1994).
16. J.F. Booker & R.A. Young, Modeling Intrastate and Interstate Markets for
ColoradoRiver Water Resources, 26 J. ENVTL. ECONS. & MANAGEMENT 66 (1994).
17. Charles W. Howe & W. Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper Colorado

River Basin: Problems and Policy Alternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF THE
WESTERN UNITED STATES 169, 193-98 (Mohamed T. EI-Ashry & Diana C. Gibbons eds.,
1988).
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changing economic, demographic, and technological scene, resulting in
patterns of water use that become increasingly inefficient. Large intrastate
and interstate water use inefficiencies present unique opportunities for
"win-win" resolutions, i.e., situations in which water transfers could
produce sufficient benefits from which all affected parties could profit (in
economic jargon, a so-called "Pareto improvement"). Unfortunately, it is
frequently not practicable to compensate the losers from water transfers
due to difficulties in identification and their potential existence in different
legal jurisdictions."8 The real and perceived existence of significant
uncompensated losses in areas-of-origin has stimulated resistance to large
(and especially out-of-basin) water transfers generally, and to the water
market process in particular.
II. PUBLIC VALUES THAT ARE INADEQUATELY PROTECTED UNDER
CURRENT WATER MARKET PROCEDURES

Public values are values that are unlikely to be taken into account by
private transactors in the market process. In the water resources area,
these values include the unique importance of social and cultural values
generated by water, the important instream values that are not protected by
property rights, external costs imposed directly on other parties due to
jurisdictional boundaries that relieve water users of liability for damage,
and the "secondary economic impacts" imposed on areas-of-origin,
especially agricultural communities when agricultural water use is
substantially reduced. The importance of these values, in the case of water
transfers, implies that market-based transactions in water are likely to
generate inefficiencies and inequities to a greater extent than market-based
transactions in other sectors of the economy. Ignoring or under-weighting
these values can occur for various reasons as discussed in detail below.
Due largely to these highly visible, negative impacts on public values,
there has been increasing resistance to water marketing and, in particular,
to out-of-basin transfers of water. Recent newspaper citizen letters have
expressed concerns.19 In Colorado, legislation has been introduced in
several recent legislative sessions to prohibit or constrain out-of-basin
transfers.2" It is worthwhile, therefore, to identify these public values, to
determine the extent to which they warrant protection, and to explore ways
in which this protection might be provided without foregoing the
advantages of water markets.
A.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL VALUES GENERATED BY WATER.

Many community values cannot be captured in monetary terms but
warrant consideration in decisions about water transfers. A recent study
18. MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, RETHINKING COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 26
(John M. Olin Law & Econs. Working Paper No. 72 (2d Series), 1999) (This paper may
also be downloaded at <http://papes.ssrn.com/paper.tafrabstract_id = 164902>).
19. See Nancy Strong, Enjoy Cantaloupes While You Can, THE DENVER POST, Sept. 19,
1999, at H5.
20. H.B. 97-1286, 61" Leg. 1", Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1997); H.B. 95-1240, 60"h Leg., 1St
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1995); S.J. Mem'i 96-2, 60th Leg., 2d. Reg. Sess. (Colo. 1996).
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points out that water is one of the most attractive visual elements of the
landscape and that in arid landscapes, especially, there is a wide range of
cultural, spiritual, and religious values related to water. Current policies
for water management address only a few of the relevant human values.21
This is particularly true in traditional, low-income communities in which
In the
water often plays an important symbolic, cultural role.
Southwestern United States, the acequia system not only supports local
agricultural needs, but also maintains social cohesion because maintenance
of the canals and distribution of the water are community efforts.2 2 Costilla
County, Colorado, provides a good demonstration of the acequia
community's cohesion: the village of San Luis, Colorado has banded
together to fight the degradation of its waters caused by logging on the
adjacent Taylor Ranch. 23
In these old systems, the water rights typically belong to the
community, so that community-wide decisions have to be made if water is
to be sold and transferred outside the community. While this appears to
require a consensus on water sales, the low-income levels and the
seemingly high prices offered for water make such decisions difficult,
requiring a tradeoff not only between the level of agricultural activities and
alternatives made possible by the proceeds from water sales but between
lifestyles and cultures. In a well-known New Mexico water rights case, the
judge is said to have stated: "[I]t is simply assumed by the applicants that
greater economic benefits are more desirable than the preservation of
cultural identity. This is clearly not so ...I am persuaded that to transfer
water rights, devoted for more than a century to agricultural purposes, in
order to construct a playground for those who can pay is a poor trade
indeed." 24 Although this decision was reversed on appeal, it stands as a
classic statement of the importance of historic patterns of water use. 5 In
another New Mexico case, the state engineer negotiated a compromise
between the acequia and industry that sought to purchase and transfer
45.35 acre-feet of surface rights from one of the acequia landowners on the
historic Anton Chico Land Grant. 26 The judge stated that "the thirty to
forty-five acres of land that would have gone fallow might not seem
significant to the outside observer, but within the acequia system, custom
and tradition require that all water users participate in the upkeep and
maintenance of the entire system. ,27
Cultural values associated with water are not confined to particular

21.

Shmuel Burmil et al., Human Values and Perceptions of Water in Arid Landscapes,

44 LANDSCAPE& URB. PLAN. 99 (1999).

22. See STANLEY CRAWFORD, MAYORDOMO: CHRONICLE OF AN ACEQUIA IN NORTHERN
NEW MEXICO (1988).
23. See Peter McBride, Chaos Comes to Costilla County, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, June 9,

1997, at 1.
24.

JOSE

A.

RIVERA,

ACEQUIA CULTURE:

SOUTHWEST 161 (1998) (citing

RA 84-53(C)
25. Id. at
26. Id. at
27. Id. at

WATERS,

LAND, AND COMMUNITY IN THE

In re Howard Sleeper et al., Rio Arriba County Cause No.

(N.M. Div. 5, First Judicial Dist. April 16, 1985)).
158.
162-64.
164.
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ethnic groups. Farm families place a high value on the farm or ranch
lifestyle. Kenneth Weber interviewed farmers engaged in agriculture in the
Arkansas Valley of Colorado, farmers who "stick it out" on marginally
profitable farms because they value the farm lifestyle. 2' Even after selling
the water from their lands, many farmers retain their farm homes. Weber
found that of thirty-six Crowley County, Colorado farmers who had sold
their water,2 9 thirty-four remained in the county. This is not to argue that
traditional societies should forever remain unchanged, but it is to argue that
the economic "playing field" is uneven between low-income traditional
societies and the more advanced sectors, and that maintenance of these
cultures is of concern to society at large.
B.

ENVIRONMENTAL, RECREATIONAL, AND ECOSYSTEM VALUES
GENERATED BY WATER SYSTEMS: THE PROBLEM OF "PUBLIC

GOODS"
Some of the undervalued services provided by water systems, like the
environment and recreation, share two unique characteristics: (1) the
benefits can be enjoyed by many people without diminishing the quality of
the benefit for others; and (2) it is impractical to require people to pay for
the benefit. An example would be an improvement in water quality that
can be enjoyed by many downstream parties including recreationists, urban
utilities, agricultural irrigators, and all parties who value healthy riparian
ecosystems. Such a benefit or good is called a "public good" in economic
jargon, not that it is necessarily publicly provided, but that it provides
widespread, non-rival benefits.3 ° Public goods are significant because
private parties tend not to provide for or be concerned about them. 31 For
these reasons, public good values associated with instream flows are likely
to be slighted by private water rights owners and even by public agencies
that cannot gain revenues from their provision.
It is clear that water transfers can affect water quality, instream values,
and riparian habitat. It is axiomatic that out-of-basin transfers will have a
negative effect on the basin-of-origin and a positive one on the basin-ofdestination. Diminished flows in the basin-of-origin eventually affect the

28. See Kenneth R. Weber, Comment, Effects of Water Transfers ol Rural Areas: A
Response to Shupe, Weatherford, and Checchio, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 13-15 (1990); see
also Kenneth R. Weber, What Becomes of Farmers Who Sell Their Irrigation Water?: The
Case of Water Sales in Crowley County, Colorado (Nov. 16, 1989) (unpublished
manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author); Kenneth R. Weber,
Irrigation Water Sales in Crowley and Otero Counties, Colorado: Social and Historical
Context (Sept. 2, 1988) (unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file
with author).
29. See Kenneth R. Weber, What Becomes of Farmers Who Sell Their Irrigation
Water?: The Case of Water Sales in Crowley County, Colorado (Nov. 16, 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author) (finding that
many shares in the Colorado Canal were sold to Aurora and Colorado Springs, however,
thirty-four shares remained in Crowley County).
30. See CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 94-95 (2000).
31. The economically efficient price for a true "public good" is zero because it is
desirable that anyone who can benefit from it should do so, even if their valuation of the
good is quite low.
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streambed and riparian vegetation, which in turn affect wildlife dependent
on certain bank and vegetation conditions. 32 This is only an example of the
negative effects.
A highly visible negative effect occurs when irrigated land is dried up.
If revegetation is not undertaken, noxious weeds and blowing dust are
likely to result. Revegetation of long-irrigated land has proven to be very
difficult due to the changes in the composition of the soil. In the case of
the Rocky Ford minority transfer, the water court required that part of the
water not be removed from the land until revegetation had been
successfully carried out.
C.

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VALUES LOST THROUGH "JURISDICTIONAL
EXTERNALITIES"

In all water administration systems, there remain unrecognized
"opportunity costs" of water abstraction.33 These are downstream benefits
that are lost by virtue of upstream abstraction. At the intrastate level, one
can again cite the Vaux and Howitt study of transfer opportunities in
California as evidence of institutional barriers to water transfers; barriers
that obfuscate the true opportunity costs of the water being used in different
parts of the state.3 ' A current case in Colorado exhibiting the same
shortcoming is the Eastern Slope's rapidly-growing Arapahoe County's
application for the import of 60,000 acre-feet per year from the headwaters
of the Gunnison River on the western slope.35
While there is
"unappropriated water" in the Gunnison system, large downstream values
are generated by every acre-foot of water left in the stream. As noted
earlier, Howe and Ahrens have estimated that these values for the
Gunnison are at least $140 per acre-foot.36
A prime example of losses occasioned at the interstate level due to
failure to recognize downstream costs is the increase in salinity caused by
the Grand Valley Irrigation Project in Western Colorado. Prior to the
Bureau of Reclamation's salinity control program for the Project, G.W.
Skogerboe, R.L. Walker, and Leathers estimated that the Grand Valley
Project was contributing ten (short) tons of salt to the Colorado River per

32.

WARREN VIESSMAN,

JR. & CLAIRE WELTY, WATER MANAGEMENT: TECHNOLOGY

AND INSTITUTIONS 164-83 (1985).

33. The expression "opportunity cost" refers to the benefits relinquished elsewhere
when resources are consumed by some application. It is thus the true measure of cost, as
opposed to monetary costs, that frequently fail to reflect the real sacrifices made through
resource use. Opportunity costs ("real costs") may be difficult to determine.
34. H.J. Vaux, Jr. & Richard E. Howitt, Managing Water Scarcity: An Evaluation of
Interregional Transfers, 20 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 785 (1984).
35. See Katrina M. Ohman, Federal Public Land Agencies and Watershed Protection:
The Upper Gunnison Basin (1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Colorado
(Boulder)) (on file with the Political Science Department at the University of Colorado
(Boulder)).
36. See Charles W. Howe & W. Ashley Ahrens, Water Resources of the Upper
Colorado River Basin: Problems and Policy Alternatives, in WATER AND ARID LANDS OF
THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 169 (Mohamed T. EI-Ashry & Diana C. Gibbons eds.,
1988).
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irrigated acre per year.37 This addition of salt occurs just before the River
flows out of the State of Colorado and hence through Utah to the Lower
Basin. Since 10,000 tons of salt added to the Upper Basin results in an
increase in a Lower Basin Imperial Dam total-dissolved-solids
concentration of approximately 1 mg/l, it has been estimated that each ton
of salt in Upper Basin return flows results in Lower Basin damages in the
range of $16 to $48 per ton. 38 Thus, one acre of irrigated land in the
Grand Valley has historically contributed damages between $160 and $480
to Lower Basin.
These patterns continue not from illegal activity or ill intent but from
the institutional framework for water administration. The Colorado River
framework is divided into Upper Basin and Lower Basin state-by-state
areas, with each assigned allowable uses under existing compacts and state
laws. These jurisdictions were established to solve various political and
equity problems in water administration, such as a fair, reliable sharing of
water. However, the lack of coincidence between political boundaries and
river basins has allowed decision-makers to ignore downstream opportunity
costs. The resultant downstream externalities can be called "jurisdictional
externalities." As a consequence, while the resulting patterns of water use
may be considered fair in an historical context, they have become
increasingly inefficient from an economic point of view. The implication
is that the geographical extent of the markets is not great enough to allow
the markets to reflect total system opportunity costs.
D. THE PROBLEM OF "SECONDARY ECONOMIC IMPACTS" OF WATER
TRANSFERS

The phrase "secondary economic impacts" of water transfers refers to
changes in the levels of economic activity experienced by those who supply
inputs to or process the outputs of the seller or the buyer in a water
transfer. Since the majority of transfers in the Western United States are
from agricultural to urban uses, the negative secondary impacts associated
with the sale of irrigation water would consist of the reduced sales of
agricultural inputs like seed, fertilizer, chemicals, and equipment, and
In
reduced levels of further processing of agricultural products.39
economic terminology, these activities are said to be either "backward
linked" (suppliers) or "forward linked" (processors) to the water selling
and buying activities. The positive side of the transfer provides the

37. G.W. Skogerboe & W.R. Walker, Salt Pickup from IrrigatedLands in the Grand
Valley of Colorado, 2 J. ENVTL. QUALITY 377, 377-82 (1973); R.L. Leathers, The

Economics of Managing Saline Irrigation Return Flows in the Upper Colorado River Basin:
Case Study of Grand Valley, Colorado (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Colorado
State University) (on file with the Colorado State University Library).
38. Jay C. Anderson & Alan P. Kleinman, Salinity Management Options for the
Colorado River, in WATER RESOURCES PLANNING SERIES REPORT P-78-003, 33-37 (Utah
Water Research Laboratory, June 1978).
39.

See Ari M. Michelsen, Administrative, Institutional, and Structural Characteristics

WATER RESOURCES BULLETIN 971 (1994);
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY,
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1992).

of an Active Water Market, 30

see also
EQUITY,
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benefits generated by new urban supplies.
The usual economic view of secondary impacts is that they are simply
the way the market works to withdraw or supplement resources at the two
ends of a resource transfer. In the private sector, businesses are not held
liable for losses imposed on forward or backward linked firms, so why pay
attention to these effects when evaluating resource transfers that are under
public sector jurisdiction? Furthermore, the secondary economic gains at
the buying end presumably more than offset the secondary losses at the sale
end.
Thus, the usual practice in cost-benefit analysis is to omit
consideration of secondary impacts.4"
This attitude ignores the uniqueness of water as a social and
environmental value, especially in rural areas.
It also ignores the
following: (1) that the secondary losses are felt in one location, while the
secondary gains are generally felt elsewhere; (2) that the transfers of
human and other resources away from the point of sale often take many
months at the cost of job search, moving expenses, and social disturbance;
and (3) that the timing of the gains and losses differ since the losses occur
either prior to or during the water transfer while offsetting gains are
typically in the future since cities and industry typically buy water in
anticipation of future needs.
Sale of water is most frequently from marginal, depressed agricultural
areas, 41 often resulting in long-term unemployment of human and nonspecialized resources. From the point of view of economic efficiency, the
idleness of resources that would otherwise have been employed constitutes
a real economic cost. Especially in the case of large water transfers, the
negative secondary impacts in the area-of-origin are highly visible and
attract public opposition to transfers. The absence of compensation and
assistance to the area of origin exacerbates the malaise.
The analysis of data on historical transfers from the Arkansas River
Valley in Colorado illustrates the negative impacts of transfers on the area
of origin. The city of Pueblo, Colorado, annexed land and received water
transfers from nearby horticultural operations.
Table 1 exhibits the
estimated negative impacts of these transfers directly on agriculture and
indirectly on the forward and backward linked activities of the Arkansas
Valley.

40. It is the loss of net incomes and not the total loss of sales that is the relevant measure
for these secondary impacts. There are also non-monetary environmental and social losses
and gains that stem from the secondary impacts.
41. Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water
Transfers in the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 1200 (1990); MacDonnell & Rice, supra note 7.
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Table 1
Estimated Negative Impacts of Older Historical Transfers
from Irrigation to Local Municipal and Industrial Use:
Arkansas River, Colorado.42
1971-1972
Direct and Indirect Reductions in Employment:
total reduction = 157 jobs
1 job per 73 acres (29 ha.)
Direct and Indirect Reductions in Regional Net Income:
$5,290,000 per year (1988 dollars)
$229 per acre-foot of consumptive use.43

These transfers, however, supported the growth of new industry in the

same economic area, probably leading to net gains for the regional
economy. Later transfers were larger and came from more marginal lands
that had grown mostly feed and forage crops. However, these later sales
were to points outside the Arkansas River Valley economic area.44 While
the reductions in regional employment and income per acre were lower
than for the earlier transfers, the later transfers had noticeably larger

aggregate impacts. See data in Table 2.

42. The historical transfers analyzed were (1971) Las Animas town Ditch to Pueblo
West, 10,000 acre-feet; (1971) Highline Canal to Pueblo, 2,600 acre-feet; (1972) BoothOrchard to Pueblo, 9,000 acre-feet; (1972) Holson Ditch to Pueblo, 1488 acre-feet. Total
acre-feet = 23,088. Total acres = 11,500.
43. Charles W. Howe et al., The Economic Impacts of Agriculture-to-Urban Water
Transfers in the Area of Origin: A Case Study of the Arkansas River Valley in Colorado,
AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 120 (1990); see also author's background working papers.
44. Colorado Springs and Aurora were important purchasers. While Colorado Springs
is technically in the Arkansas River drainage, its economy is widely separated from that of
the Valley.
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Table 2
Estimated Negative Impacts of 1984-1991 Arkansas River Transfers
from Irrigation to Out-of-Basin Municipal and Industrial Use:
45
Arkansas River, Colorado
Reductions in Employment:
total reduction = 59 jobs
1 job per 1142 acres
Reduction in Regional Net Income
$6,740,200 per year
46
of consumptive use
acre-foot
$50 per

In Crowley County, Colorado, the sale of over 100,000 acre-feet of
water from 40,000 acres of land under the Colorado Canal resulted in
large-scale, negative impacts, including a drop in the County's tax base at a
time when increased social services were badly needed. 47 If further large
water sales take place, it seems likely that some of the superior acreages
growing the high value crops will be lost, and that impacts will be more
severe.

III.

How SHOULD PUBLIC VALUES BE PROTECTED?

Once it is observed that there are important public values that are
unique to water resources that are not adequately protected in water market
transactions, the issue arises as to how to protect the values in an
economically efficient manner, i.e. at the least cost to the rest of the
economy. Water markets will, and should, continue to play a major role in
the allocation of water. However, the functioning of markets needs to be
strengthened through institutional reform and constrained where it fails to
account for important social values. Western United States water policy
analyses suggest that the following steps warrant serious consideration.

45. The transfers included were: (1984) Las Animas Consolidated Extension to Public
Service Company, 10,186 acre-feet, (1985) Colorado Canal to Colorado Springs, 43,180
acre-feet, the 1974 sale of Twin Lakes shares to Pueblo, Colorado Springs and Aurora,
57,000 acre-feet, (1990) Rocky Ford to Aurora, 18,770 acre-feet, (1986) Highline Canal to
Aurora, 2,250 acre-feet, and the (1991) Keesee Ditch, 3,500 acre-feet. Total acre-feet =
134,886. Total acres = 67,400.
46. Howe et al., supra note 42.
47. Kenneth R. Weber, Irrigation Water Sales in Crowley and Otero Counties,
Colorado: Social and Historical Context (Sept. 2, 1988) (unpublished manuscript,
University of Colorado (Boulder) on file with author).
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A. PROTECTING SOCIAL, CULTURAL, AND ENVIRONMENTAL VALUES

Great complexities are involved in protecting cultural values of lowincome, culturally differentiated communities (i.e. old Hispanic
communities of the Southwest) within the broader market framework of the
rest of the economy. While ruling out transfers from such communities
would protect one set of values, it would deny the members of the
The main
community opportunities to profit through water sales.
protective step in such situations is to vest the water rights in the
community and not in individuals, necessitating community-wide decisions
to sell water. The community-wide tradeoffs between funds raised through
water sales and the continuation of traditional activities can then be
addressed fully.
The protection of environmental and aesthetic values requires collective
action. Since individual water users will not be able in most cases to
acquire sufficient water rights to protect instream flows or to offset
decreases in water quality, public entities (local, county, state, or special
district) should be allowed to hold water rights for instream protection
purposes. An example of instream flow protection is found in a recent
dedication of $12 million worth of water rights to protect late season flows
Under Colorado law, the Colorado Water
in Boulder, Colorado.
administers instream flows. The CWCB is
("CWCB")
Board
Conservation
charged with enforcement of the instream rights. The process can be
simplified and streamlined by allowing local and county governments and
special districts to hold water rights for instream protection.
Protection of the broader range of social and environmental values
requires a broadening of the "no injury" concept. The States of California,
Wyoming, New Mexico, and Utah require the water transfer review
process to take into account a range of community values.48
B. MITIGATING "JURISDICTIONAL EXTERNALITIES" THROUGH THE
GEOGRAPHICAL EXPANSION OF WATER MARKETS

Many of the external costs imposed on other water users mentioned
earlier stem from the existence of political sub-divisions that differ from
the river basins being administered. Since water law in the United States is
mostly a state matter, and since the historical creation of water rights could
not anticipate the future values of various water uses like instream values,
the rules by which water is allocated are frequently myopic from a river
basin point of view. Even the interstate compacts that divide water among
states become outdated from an economic point of view due to differing
growth rates, economies, and demographics.49
48. MacDonnell, supra note 7; see also Brian E. Gray, A Priner on California Water
Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 745 (1989); Mark Squillace, Water Marketing in
Wyoming, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 865 (1989); Charles T. DuMars & Michele Minnis, New
Mexico Water Law: Determining Public Welfare Values in Water Rights Allocation, 31
ARIZ. L. REV. 817 (1989); Ray Jay Davis, Utah Water Rights Transfer Law, 31 ARIZ. L.
REV. 841 (1989).
49. Lynne L. Bennett et al., The Interstate River Compact as a Water Allocation
Mechanism: Efficiency Aspects, AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. (forthcoming November, 2000)
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One way of mitigating jurisdictional externalities would be to establish
river basin authorities or commissions with the power to consider the entire
river basin in the planning process. This was, in fact, undertaken in the
Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 ("1965 Act"), which authorized the
establishment of river basin commissions for planning and management
purposes. 50 Seven commissions were subsequently established: New
England, Great Lakes, Ohio, Upper Mississippi, Pacific Northwest,
Souris-Red-Rainy, and the Missouri. A member from each riparian state,
the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Reclamation (in the West)
comprised each commission.5 While some of the commissions were able
to coordinate water policies, including water quality programs, others were
largely ineffective due to a unanimity requirement for all decisions. The
commissions established under the 1965 Act were dissolved during the
Reagan administration. Other types of river basin commissions have been
established under congressional approval that have been effective in dealing
with basin-wide problems. The Potomac and Delaware Commissions stand
out in this regard. 2
Another step toward overcoming jurisdictional externalities would be to
extend water markets to encompass larger parts of or entire river basins.
At the intrastate level, better informational systems for offers to buy and
sell water rights could be organized, similar to the simple bulletin board
approach of the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District. 3 The
information could be computerized on a basin-wide scale. At the interstate
level, there are significant opportunities for efficient reallocations. In
1991, the State of California proposed the establishment of an "interstate
water bank" on the Colorado River for organizing annual interstate water
leases. 54 The trades were to have taken place through each states' water
agencies so that broader public interest issues would be taken into account.
While the proposal was quickly vetoed by several states, interest in
interstate water markets has continued. The Bureau of Reclamation has
assisted the three Lower Basin states (Arizona, California, and Nevada) in
arriving at an exchange and storage agreement that has many of the
features of a market.55
The effectiveness of extending the geographical scope of water markets
depends in part on broadening the concept of "beneficial use" and the
broadening of the "no injury" requirement. Since many of the values that
are currently ignored in water allocation and reallocation are instream
(manuscript on file with author).
50. Water Resources Planning Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-80, 79 Stat. 244 (codified
in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
51. See NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, A SUMMARY-DIGEST OF STATE WATER LAWS
(Richard L. Dewsnut et. al. eds., 1973).
52. See U.S. COUNCIL OF ENVTL. QUALITY, THE DELAWARE RIVER BASIN: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT OF THREE CENTURIES OF CHANGE (1975).
53. Charles W. Howe et al., Innovative Approaches to Water Allocation: The Potential
for Water Markets, 22 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH 439, 443 (1986).
54. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, supra note 10.
55. Robert Macy, 77ree States Bank on Water Pact to Quench Future Needs, DENVER
POST, Oct. 31, 1999, at A37; Robert Macy, Interior Green Lights Water Banking Plan,
BOULDER DAILY CAMERA, Oct. 29, 1999, at BIO.
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values, extending a water market to encompass downstream areas where
many instream values are generated would accomplish little in a system
where instream values are not uniformly recognized as "beneficial" and to
which the "no injury" requirement is not extended.
C. MITIGATING THE REAL COSTS OF ADJUSTMENT FOR BASINS-OFORIGIN

Real economic efficiency costs are caused by the secondary impacts
imposed on largely agricultural areas from which large quantities of water
are transferred. These costs are imposed during the transition period on
activities that are "backward linked" (supplying inputs) or "forward
linked" (processing outputs) to agriculture and related populations.
Communities absorb these costs, often with great hardship. Since these
costs are not likely to be taken into account by buyers and sellers in water
markets, excessive transfers will occur.
It would be appropriate, therefore, from both efficiency and equity
viewpoints that buyers and/or sellers make compensatory payments to
public authorities in the area-of-origin.5 6 This compensation should be in a
form that will meet the priority adjustment needs of the area-of-origin. An
example of inefficient compensation to areas-of-origin is found in the
Colorado Water Conservancy District Act of 1937, which requires projects
exporting water from the Colorado River Basin to another part of Colorado
to provide "compensatory storage" within the Colorado Basin. 7 For
example, the compensatory storage provided by the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project took the form of GreenMountain Reservoir on the Blue
River below the Lake Dillon site that was built far ahead of any need for
flow augmentation.
The suddenness of some transfers leaves little time for adjustment in
the exporting region and increases the severity of the impacts. Thus, a
second method for mitigating the negative effects on the area-of-origin
would be to require a spreading of the withdrawals over a period of years.
This is frequently required by Colorado water courts for purposes of
revegetating lands dried up by water transfers. Spreading the transfer over
time can probably be done with little damage to the buyer of the water
because cities typically buy in advance of actual need.
The negative impacts of large water transfers on areas-of-origin could
be further mitigated by encouraging the lands from which senior water is to
be transferred to acquire other, more junior water to keep the land in
production. In water transfer cases involving ditch company shares,
Colorado water courts can require lands from which the water has been
sold to remain dried up in perpetuity to protect against the possibility that
the ditch company might "expand its rights" by calling for water in excess
56. Lawrence J. MacDonnell & Charles W. Howe, Area-of-Origin Protection in
Transbasin Water Diversions: An Evaluation of Alternative Approaches, 57 U. COLO. L.
REV. 527, 536 (1986); Lawrence J. MacDonnell, The Water Transfer Process as a
Management Option for Meeting Changing Water Demnands, report to the U.S. Geological
Survey, No. 14-08-0001-G1538, Nat. Resources L. Ctr., U. Colo. (April 1990).
57. See H.B. 714, 31St Leg. (Colo. 1937).
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of the remaining historical share.58 In the case of direct transfer of state
water rights, it makes sense to let the farmer sell senior rights, and then
buy junior rights to maintain some form of farming operations. Depending
on the reliability of the rights purchased, the cropping pattern might have
to be changed but may still be profitable given the lower investment in
water rights. The secondary effects on the community will be less severe
than with the permanent drying up of the land. Since the purpose of water
administration is "to maximize the beneficial use of all of the waters of this
state," such re-watering of the land should be facilitated. 59
IV.

CONCLUSION

An evaluation of alternative water allocation mechanisms has shown
that water markets play an important role, and will play an increasing role,
in the allocation and reallocation of water. While markets perform the
allocative role quite well within the framework of the private values of the
buyer and seller, important public values are likely to be overlooked in the
process. Thus, the water market process needs public attention. The
positive features of water markets can be expanded in use and the
weaknesses can be mitigated to maximize the social utility of these valuable
social mechanisms.

58. See e.g. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996) (City of
Thornton purchased Water Storage and Supply Company shares).
59. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-102(1)(a) (1999).

